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ABSTRACT 
 
PATTERNS OF FINANCIAL CAPITAL FLOWS AND ACCUMULATION IN THE POST-
1990 TURKISH ECONOMY 
Biçer, F. Gül 
M.A., Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Erinç Yeldan 
 
July 2003 
 
Decreasing investment opportunities in the industrialized countries and arbitrage 
seeking approach of the developed countries has caused to surge of capital inflows to the 
developing countries in 1990s. After capital account liberalization in 1989, Turkey has also 
exposed the capital flows and faced with the negative impacts due to the lack of capital 
controls and the early timing of capital account liberalization before providing economic, 
political and legal requirements.The thesis analyse the impacts of macroeconomic variables 
with capital inflows and the behaviour of investment with macroeconomic prices and capital 
inflows for Turkey using econometric techniques.  
 
Keywords and phrases: Capital Inflows, Capital Account Liberalization, Developing 
Countries, Arbitrage Seeking, Investment, Turkey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii
  
ÖZET 
 
1990 SONRASI TÜRKİYE EKONOMİSİ’ NDE FİNANSAL SERMAYE HAREKETLERİ 
Biçer, F. Gül 
Yüksek Lisans, İktisat Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Erinç Yeldan 
 
Temmuz 2003 
 
Doksanlı yıllarda endüstrileşmiş ülkelerdeki yatırım olanaklarının azalması ve 
gelişmekte olan ülkelerdeki arbitraj fırsatları, kısa vadeli sermaye hareketlerinin gelişmiş 
ülkelerden gelişmekte olan ülkelere yönelmesini sağlamıştır. 1989’da sermaye hareketlerinin 
serbestleşmesi sonucu, Türkiye ekonomisi de diğer gelişmekte olan ülkeler gibi kısa vadeli 
sermaye hareketlerinin sebep olduğu negatif etkilere maruz kalmıştır. Bunda sermaye 
hareketlerinin girişinin kontrol edilmemesinin ve gerekli ekonomik, politik ve hukuki 
düzenlemeler yapılmaksızın sermaye hareketlerinin serbestleştirilmesinin önemli bir etkisi 
olmuştur. Bu tez sermaye girişlerinin makro değişkenlerle etkisini ve yatırım davranışlarının 
makro fiyatlardan ve sermaye girişlerinden nasıl etkilendiğini Türkiye için ekonometrik 
tekniklerle incelemektedir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Sermaye Girişleri, Sermaye Hareketlerinin Liberalleştirilmesi, Arbitraj , 
Yatırım, Türkiye. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The 1990s witnessed a surge in capital flows to the developing countries. As 
measured by the surplus on the capital account, the developing countries of Latin 
America and Asia alone have received a sum of $670 billion of foreign capital 
from 1990 to 1994 (Calvo, et al., 1996). Net flows diminished significantly in 1995 
in the aftermath of the Mexican crisis, but in most cases surged once again to reach 
high levels by the end of the decade.  Furthermore, a structural shift was observed 
in the composition of the private flows, with portfolio and other short-term capital 
flows gaining importance (UNCTAD, 1998). 
 
The rise of foreign capital inflows has initially been a welcome development. 
The foreign exchange constraint which seemed binding during the 1970s and 80s 
seem to have been suddenly relaxed with positive effects on consumption and 
investment.  In fact, theory suggests that inflows of capital would complement 
national savings and that financial liberalization would improve the allocation of 
scarce funds both internationally and intertemporally.  Accordingly, in a world of 
freely mobile capital, investable funds would flow from high-saving to low-saving 
countries.  This process would tend to equalize interest rates across the global
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financial markets, North and South, and as such, it would enable the indigenous 
countries to escape the size constraints on their domestic asset markets. 
 
This benign view of international capital mobility has been challenged by 
the crisis episodes of the last two decades. Both the numerous empirical case 
studies and the policy lessons of the Mexican, Turkish, Argentina, and more 
recently East Asian experiences revealed that the expected beneficial effects of 
capital inflows have been overshadowed by the adverse impacts of excessive stock 
market volatility and the persistence of exchange rate risk against unforeseen 
fluctuations in the exchange rates.  Furthermore, in such a world of volatile 
exchange rates, the traditional dictum regarding the global equalization of real 
interest rates failed to take place.  In such a world, it is clearly observed that the 
free mobility of international capital flows does not suffice to equalize real interest 
rates that are denominated in different currencies.  The persistent diverging nature 
of the real rates of return across countries have been studied and documented in 
Frankel (1991, and 1993); Marston (1993); Halwood and MacDonald (1994); 
Blecker (1998) and Eatwell (1996). 
 
Finally it is also to be noted that while the post-financial liberalization 
episodes are characterized by very large gross capital flows, they have generated 
rather small net transfers.  As is also remarked by Tobin (2000), net capital flows 
from the developed to the underdeveloped economies had been only on the order 
of $150 billions per annum during the 1990s.  One can contrast this figure with the 
daily volume of speculative foreign exchange transactions reaching to $1.5  
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trillions.  It is now a well-known fact that the gross volume of international capital 
flows across the national boundaries is far in excess of the financing needs of 
commodity trade flows or investments on physical capital, and is mostly driven by 
speculative considerations of risk hedging and currency speculation. For instance, 
using data of thirty two emerging markets for 1988-98, Rodrik and Velasco (2000: 
61) report that “… there does not appear to be any relationship between the volume 
of international trade and the level of short term debt –suggesting that trade credit 
has played little or no role in driving short-term capital flows during the 1990s”. 
 
Thus, under this characterization of the post-financial liberalization episodes, 
large capital inflows as witnessed in recent years have posed serious dilemmas and 
created significant policy challenges.  Indeed, the recent history of the financial 
crises in the “successful emerging markets” have clearly disclosed the undesirable 
macroeconomic effects of the large, uncontrolled capital inflows, such as 
persistence of high real interest rates, inflationary pressures, limitation of the 
power of the central banks to contain the pressures of monetary expansion and of 
the threat of currency substitution, real exchange rate appreciation, and widening 
current account deficits. Nevertheless, the type of capital inflows is important to 
determine severity of results. While short-term capital flows (hot money) are more 
volatile than long-term capital flows due to their high sensitivity to changes, they 
also result with much more severe disturbances. The detailed study of capital flows 
and their different impacts on economy is pursued in Chuhan, Perez-Quiros and 
Popper (1996) and by Claessens, Dooley and Warner (1995). 
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This thesis attempts to address these issues and investigates the determinants 
of short-term foreign capital inflows for Turkey following its capital account 
liberalization in 1989. Turkey’s post-financial liberalization history of 
macroeconomic and political developments remains as an enigmatic deepening of 
its crisis-prone fragility with persistent price inflation, persistent and rapidly 
expanding fiscal deficits, and increased volatility of its gross domestic product. In 
this study, I will identify capital inflows exclusively with the portfolio investments 
of residents and non-residents abroad, and, using time-series econometrics, I aim to 
search for the macro economic variables that best explain the behavior of capital 
inflows over 1992 to 2002.  I will further investigate the changing nature of the 
private investment function under post-capital account liberalization and deduce 
hypotheses on its correlation with capital flows and the key macro economic 
prices, such as the exchange rate, the real rate of interest, and real wages. 
 
The plan of the thesis is as follows: in the next chapter I study the historical 
background of the Turkish economy. The historical evoluation of Turkey’s capital 
account liberalization is explained in chapter 3. In chapter 4, I focus on how the 
macro economic balances for Turkey are affected by capital inflows. Observed 
features of foreign (financial) capital inflows in Turkey during the 1990s take place 
in chapter 5.  The econometric methodology is introduced in section 6.  Here I use 
time series econometrics to study the behavior of financial capital flows and that of 
private fixed investments  against key macro economic indicators.  I conclude the 
thesis in chapter 7. 
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2 Historical Background of The Turkish Economy 
 
Turkey has experienced serious current account deficits during 1960s and 
1970s with a serious foreign exchange gap at the end of the 1970s. All of these 
problems led the economic authorities to introduce a set of stabilization policies 
that aimed to maintain an external balance. During 1970s, low level of the interest 
rates to reduce the cost of borrowing led to the diversion of money in circulation 
from the banking sector to unproductive foreign exchange hoarding, and also to the 
unorganized  financial market. Furthermore, the interest rates are reduced to 
negative levels by the end of 1970s. The industrial policy of the period was import 
substitution. At the same time, economic autorities implemented a public 
investment program which aimed to expand the domestic production capacity in 
heavy manufacturing and capital goods. 
 
After a foreign exchange bottleneck in 1978-1979, Turkish economy has 
been liberalized by the implementation of a structural change program on January 
24, 1980. In the first stage of the program, interest rates on time deposits and 
credits were set free to provide financial deepening and increased saving.However, 
the financial liberalization between 1980 and 1982 was not successful because 
there was a need for a supervision of the financial system after setting free interest 
rates (Binay and Kunter, 1998). Another critical point of the early 1980s was the 
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financial scandal of 1982, when many money brokers collected deposits of the 
savers by offering very high interest rates and than collapsed together with a 
number of smaller banks. An unstable economic environment and inefficient 
banking system led to the bankrupcy of five banks (İstanbul Bankası, Hisarbank, 
Odibank, Bağbank and İşçi Kredi Bankası) and the intervention of the Turkish 
Central Bank to regulate the interest rates. 
In order to promote and develop the securities market, the Capital Market 
Board (CMB) was established in 1982 and started its operations in 1983. Within 
the framework of the secondary market regulations by a decree in 1983, the 
Istanbul Stock Exchange was reopened in 1985 and started its operations in 1986 
(Atiyas and Ersel, 1992). Furthermore, Turkish residents were allowed to open 
foreign accounts in banks in 1984 to increase product variety and services in the 
Turkish financial system (Denizer, 2000). Other targets of this reform were to 
bring the foreign reserves of banks that were abroad and to stop capital outflow. 
However, the underestimation of the inflationary environment during the 
application of the policy led the substitution of TL with a more acceptable currency 
(foreign exchange substitution). The best policy against the substitution could have 
been to increase the return on TL assets.  
Overall, the export-led growth model of the 1980-1988 signaled its 
insufficiency by the 1989 elections revealing the poor performance of the 
macroeconomic indicators. The next step of the liberalization act was the capital 
account liberalization in 1989. The targets were the liberalization of the foreign 
exchange system to ease the connection with the international markets, the 
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elimination of the obstacles of buying and selling activities of the stocks and bonds 
the in domestic and foreign markets, and the provision of external credit for the 
banking system (Binay and Kunter, 1998). However, capital account liberalization 
caused increased inflows of hot money, which made the economy more vulnerable 
to macroeconomic imbalances in the domestic economy and economic crisis. Most 
importantly, Turkey was not ready to the capital account liberalization because its 
political and financial reforms were not completed.  
In the same year, the Central Bank also implemented a new monetary 
program which aimed to prevent the public sector from easy access to the Central 
Bank’s credit lines. However, the government did not follow the neccessary fiscal 
measures and the Treasury continued to increase both external borrowing and 
internal borrowing which, in turn, was the main reason of the high interest rates in 
the 1989-1994 period.  
At the end of 1993, the government reversed its policy and aimed to 
decrease interest rates artificially. In this direction, a higher depreciation policy and 
the cancellation of a set of Treasury auctions were the implemented actions to 
reduce the interest rates as these policies led the banks to rearrange their foreign 
currency denominated assets and liabilities. However, this adjustment caused a rise 
in the demand for  foreign currency and became one of the leading factors of the 
1994 crisis. In April 5, a new stabilization program was implemented. In the short-
run, the program would reduce inflation and stabilize the financial markets. In the 
medium term, it would solve the public deficit and the external deficit problems. In 
the long-term, it was expected that it would provide a sustainable growth. During 
 8 
the first three months of the year, the CB tried to control the money supply with 
open market operations and tried to halt increases in the exchange rate by means of 
direct sales of foreign currency. After three months, the CB aimed to actualize the 
targets of the stabilization program and applied a tight monetary policy. The 
program and high devaluation have created some positive results during the 
remaining part of 1994 and 1995 such as improving the current account balance, 
decreasing budget deficit, and creating a short -term decrease in hot money flows. 
After the 1994 crisis, the government and the commercial banks turned again to 
short -term borrowing from abroad and lending at home due to high profit margins 
of the Treasury bills and the government bonds, i.e. they became arbitrage seekers 
without considering market risk, exchange rate risk and proper management of the 
their assets and liabilities. Therefore, Turkish economy became more vulnerable 
even to small crises. 
During 1995-1999, there was a no real improvement in the economy and 
the economic and political disabilities that caused the 1994 crisis have not been 
stabilized. In the first ten months of 1995, the CB followed the stabilization 
program of the 1994 and exchange rates have been used in line with inflation. In 
the same year, Turkey signed a stand-by agreement with IMF. However, the 
economic instability increased due to the end of the implication of the stand-by 
agreement, the changes of government, the early elections and the entrance to the 
Custom Union. 
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 In July 1998, Turkey initiated a new disinflation program with the 
guidance of IMF. The Staff Monitored Program (SMF) targeted to improve the 
fiscal balance and reduce price inflation. Although the program was successful in 
improving the fiscal balances and reducing inflation slightly, it could not solve the 
interest rate problem. The disinflation program has been broken down by the 
effects of August 1998 Russian crisis, the general elections in April 1999, and two 
highly destructive earthquakes in August and October 1999. Increasing 
government expenditures deteriorated the fiscal balance and the pressures on the 
financial market raised the real interest rates. The currency crisis caused the 
reversal of capital flows in 1998 and the outcome of the crisis was the bankruptcy 
of eight banks as they are taken over formally by the Saving Deposit Insurance 
Fund (SDIS). All of these events worsened the fiscal balance and increased the 
debt-GDP ratio so another IMF directed disinflation program was implemented in 
December 1999. The requirements and the obligations of the program were 
imposed by the first letter of intent signed in December 9, 1999. A new banking 
law was part of this program and the so-called Banking Regulation and 
Supervision Agency (BRSA) was established with this law. 
 
The second letter of intent came with the disinflation program introduced in 
December 18, which  was based on exchange rate policies. The program would use 
the nominal exchange rate as an anchor for disinflation purposes. Turkey’s 
stabilization program with the exchange rates were based on a crawling peg against 
a dollar-euro basket. Monetary authorities were to use international reserves as the 
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instrument to create the appropriate depreciation rate which is required for the 
inflation targeting (Reyes, 2002). Therefore, an exchange rate band that serves as a 
nominal anchor can be accepted as a supplement to the inflation targeting 
framework. The second letter of intent stressed the importance of the policies and 
the date of  each acts of the program was also specified.  
 
In November 2000, Turkey has experienced a severe financial crisis. The 
Supplementary Reserve Facility granted with $7.5 billions in December 22 was 
requested from the IMF to restore confidence. Furthermore, the monetary program 
was revised and the continued implementation of the program reduced the tension 
in the financial markets. Due to increased credibility which was a result of the 
monetary help by the IMF, capital flows were reversed. Central Bank`s reserves 
returned to their precrisis levels and the interest rates decreased by the beginning of 
2001. The program achieved reducing inflation but it was not adequate to prevent 
currency appreciation, the increase of fragility of banking system and the 
vulnerability to external impacts.  Additionally, the political dispute between the 
Prime Minister and the President on February 19, 2001 triggered the reemergence 
of the financial market crisis creating a reduction in the monetary base and a rise in 
the interest rates (short-term interest rates jumped up to above 5000%). As a result, 
Turkey experienced economic and currency crises simultaneously (twin crises) in 
November 2000 and February 2001. The response of the government was to let 
free float of exchange rates, let the Turkish lira to depreciate ferociously and a new 
agreement with the IMF (a new letter of intent). Imposibility of an open capital 
 11 
account, a pegged exchange rate and independent monetary policy together were 
observed once more (Fischer, 2002). 
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3  Capital Account Liberalization: Theory and The Turkish 
Experience 
 
Financial liberalization has become one of the main economic concerns for 
most of the countries for the last twenty years due to the fact that the constraints on 
the financial resources were distracting the efficient distribution of the economic 
resources and potential growth rates (McKinnon ,1973 and Shaw, 1973). Basic 
targets of the financial liberalization are increasing the savings, attracting foreign 
capital and increasing efficiency in the usage of financial resources. However, the 
economic and political stability, efficiency in a well controled banking system and 
the level of interest rates are the important factors to determine a good 
liberalization policy (Binay and Kunter, 1998). 
 
In fact, the implementation of positive interest rates, the new possibility of 
foreign exchange accounts, the advance of financial deepening for the private 
households have meant increased foreign exchange deposits with vigorous 
currency substitution (Guncavdi and Bleaney, 1996a).  Thus, it can be stated that 
the "pioneers of financial deepening" in Turkey in the 1980's have been the public 
sector securities and the forex deposits. Furthermore, Turkey's stabilization and 
adjustment program of 1980 aimed to change the pattern of the development 
strategy and the domestic resources to channel for investment through more 
efficient intermediation in financial markets along with Mckinnon-Shaw
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 hypothesis (Guncavdi and Bleaney, 1996b). However, as Akyüz (1990) attests, 
Turkish experience did not conform to the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis of financial 
deepening with a shift of portfolio selection from "unproductive" assets to those 
favoring fixed capital formation. 
 
During 1990`s, industrialized countries turned towards emerging markets for 
investment and so capital flows leaked to the developing countries. The main 
reasons behind this movement were the reduction of investment opportunities in 
the industrialized countries and arbitrage seeking. However, the capital flows 
carried significant risk factors together with their expended positive effects such as 
providing additional finance and enhancing investment opportunities. On the other 
hand, equity liabilities such as FDIs are less likely to cause any crisis, as oposed to 
debt liabilities because they are not under the pressure of either currency or 
maturity mismatches (Fernandez, and Hausmann, 2000). Additionally, the foreign 
direct investments (FDI) bring new technology, better investment and management 
opportunities and they cannot be revered easily. However, most of the capital 
flows take the form of hot money and portfolio investments because capital 
inflows from the developed countries search for a politically and economically safe 
market for long-term investments. Yet, this is not the case for most of the 
developing countries, and short-term capital flows destabilize the macroeconomic 
balances and increases the fragility of the country against crisis.  
 
 FDI has low sensitivity to international interest rate differentials and the aim 
of this type of investment is long-term profitability (Lopez-Mejia, 1999). On the 
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other hand, the short-term capital flows are more short-term oriented and have 
greater volatility because reversing them is less costly than reversing FDIs.  
 
Globalization of an economy spreads the effects of the economic outcomes 
throughout the countries and these outcomes may bring positive or negative 
externalities. Rising capital flows to the larger countries stimulates capital inflows 
to the smaller countries in the same region. Therefore, a successful stabilization 
program in one or more of the larger countries which increases capital inflows to 
these countries may have positive externalities on the smaller countries in the 
region (Calvo and Reinhart, 1996). Furthermore, the investors face with the 
problem of imperfect information because the available time is very short to 
transform the information for the investments that is made by short-term capital 
flows. The imperfect information causes inflows of capital to the countries with the 
same characteristics in the case of positive effects and causes outflows of capital 
from the same type of countries in the case of negative effects such as crisis. 
Tequila Crisis in 1995, the 1997 East Asian Crisis and the 1998 Russian Crisis are 
the typical examples of negative externalities. 
 
With its capital account liberalization in 1989,  Turkish domestic market was 
exposed to the volatile movements of the short- term capital flows (flows of “hot 
money”). The observed volatility was due to high arbitrage opportunities in the 
market and the insecure economic and political environment such as high inflation 
rate, low growth rate and the continuum of early elections. Net portfolio 
investments fluctuated abruptly through the 1990s between $3.9 billion (1993) and  
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$-6.7 billion (1998) and $-4.5 (2001). In particular, Turkey’s crisis experiences in 
1994, the 1998 Russian Crisis, and the 2000 crisis were the accelerator of these 
huge jumps. Flight of capital is easy and as it takes very short time because of the 
composition of capital flows in Turkey, and any negative factor may drive away 
the capital flows. These experiences showed the importance of domestic factors for 
attracting and holding capital flows in Turkey. Such inflows enabled, on the one 
hand, financing of the accelerated public expenditures, and also provided 
temporary relief of the increased pressures of aggregate demand on the domestic 
goods markets through cheapening costs of imports. By contrast, long-term foreign 
direct investment (FDI) performance was meager, never crossing the $1 billion 
mark, save for the exceptional period of 2001. Due to low share of FDI with 
respect to hot money in the total capital flows, Turkey faced with the risks and the 
negative effects of the capital flows.  
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Figure.1. Short-term Capital Flows and FDIs. 
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In Table 3, I also provide key macro economic aggregates which are 
affected from capital flows.  I note that even though the balance on the current 
account has been mostly on the negative side, its size nevertheless was rather 
modest as a ratio to the GNP.  Except for the pre-crisis years of 1993 and 2000, the 
size of the current account deficits has been on the order of less than 1.5% of the 
GNP, suggesting that the national saving-investment gap has not been severely 
binding (see Table 3 in Appendix A). 
 
I portray the paths of the gross in- and out-flows of short term speculative 
foreign capital along with their net magnitudes in Figures 1a, 1b, and 1c.  The 
“volatility engine” (Bello, et.al., 2000) of short-term capital flows with significant 
hot components is clearly visible. 
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Figure.2.a. Portfolio Investments: Securities Sales (Inflows) and Purchases 
(Outflows) by Residents, Abroad (Millions US $) 
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Figure.2.b. Portfolio Investments: Securities Purchases (Inflows) and 
Sales (Outflows) by Non-Residents in Turkey (Millions US $) 
 
Figure 1c. Foreign Credits Received By the 
Banking Sector and Repayments 
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Figure.2.c. Foreign Credits Received By The Banking Sector and 
Repayments (Millions $) 
 
The exchange rate based disinflation and stabilisation program that is 
designed and monitored by IMF in 2000, led to appreciation of the nominal 
exchange rate. As a result of the appreciation of exchange rate, an extremely high 
increase of capital inflows was observed. It is generally known that, such type of 
programs that use the exchange rates as an anchor for inflationary expectations, 
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relying on capital inflows to finance growing external deficit, cause the 
appreciation of currency due to attracted arbitrage seeking capital inflows 
(UNCTAD, 2001). Although the real interest rates decreased on government debt 
instruments (GDIs) in 2000, the capital inflows have continued due to continued 
strict commitment of nominal exchange targets and arbitrage rate expectations of 
banks. The inflows were high during the first ten months of 2000. However, there 
was a sudden reversal of capital inflows such that non-residents liquidated their 
treasury bills by external agents in November of that year due to the 
unsustainability of Turkish domestic market.  
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4 Impacts of The Capital Flows on Macroeconomic Balances 
 
Capital account liberalization made the Turkish economy to be highly 
dependent on capital flows and caused the emergence of financial cycles. 
Substantial leakages from net inflows constituted a linkage between growth, 
current account balance, and capital flows. The rising amount of hot money 
inflows and outflows exacerbated external and domestic instability (Boratav and 
Yeldan, 2001). 
 
Turkey’s attempt for integration with the global markets was not timed well 
due to the fact that its local market was not ready yet for such an act. Since the 
countries in Latin America also made the same mistake, it became one of the most 
important reasons that destroyed their economy and led them to economic crises. 
Capital account liberalization requires some economic and legal adjustments in the 
beginning such as improvement and regulation of the banking sector, transparency, 
strong healthy fiscal and monetary policies, stable politics, and improvements of 
macroeconomic balances (i.e. GDP growth, trade balance, moderate inflation, etc.). 
On the other hand, creating requirements for capital account liberalization is not 
easy. Therefore, making the reforms as much as possible, countries should also 
apply capital controls, which Turkey failed to implement.   
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The recent studies imply the association of capital inflows with the 
appreciation of exchange rates (Calvo, et al., 1996; Fernandez-Arias and Montiel, 
1995). Choosing nominal exchange rate as an implicit anchor with no fiscal 
adjustment and the persistent high inflation was the reason of this appreciation by 
coupling with capital inflows (Celasun, et al., 1999). If the borrowing by the fiscal 
sector follows a continuum path during the exchange rate based policies (ERBSP) 
applied, the result becomes the higher appreciation of the exchange rates because 
higher internal borrowing leads to higher interest rates causing an increase in the 
capital inflows. Therefore, pursuing the existing ERBSP becomes impossible and 
the result becomes deterioration of the macro economic balances such as GDP 
growth and current account. Through the end of the ERBSP, a recession is 
inevitable. The study by Celasun (2001) suggests two results for the ERBSP: a 
sustained real exchange rate appreciation and a boom-recession cycle such that an 
increase in the consumption and aggregate demand in early stages and a recession 
later is expected. The studies by Rodriguez (1982) and Dornbusch (1982) 
suggested the inflation stickiness as the reason for the boom and recession in 
ERBSPs. Since Turkey had backward looking price settings especially in the non-
tradeable goods sector (Celasun, 2001), the stabilisation program based on ERBSP 
which was started on December 1999 is abandoned by the February 2001. 
Turkey’s macroeconomic policies were not adequate and efficient to support the 
applied ERBSP.   
  
In the figure below, I outline the movements for the real GDP growth. 
Since Turkey is not a strong net capital importer, the growth of real GDP has been 
mostly dependent on the capital inflows. Furthermore, depending on short-term 
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capital inflows rather than FDIs. Turkey’s economic growth rate increases with the 
capital inflows and decreases with the flight of capital inflows. However, the 
observed impacts of the portfolio inflows, especially by residents abroad, are 
stronger than the foreign credits by the banking sector due to the way followed by 
the banking sector credits (see also Figure 1a, 1b and 1c). The high level of interest 
rates in Turkey makes harder to invest with the banking credits and also produces a 
high return with low risk for the banking sector by means of investing in Treasury 
Bills. Therefore, the foreign credit by banking sector flows heavily on T-bills and 
weak inclination for investment and consumption leads lower level of real GDP 
growth.  Econometric results in the next parts of the thesis also prove the 
importance of the portfolio investments rather than the foreign credits by the 
banking sector by finding significant results for the portfolio investments and 
insignificant results for the other.  
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Figure.3. Real GDP Growth (1987=100) 
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Interest rates also play a significant role on the direction of capital flows. 
Especially, high short-term interest rates prepare an attractive environment for 
speculative arbitrage seeking short-term capital flows. Regardless of the initial 
level of interest rates and exchange rates, capital inflows to the developing 
countries apt to create an arbitrage margin by increasing domestic interest rates and 
appreciating real exchange rates later (Calvo, et al., 1996; Sarno and Taylor, 1999). 
Due to the fact that short-term nature of the capital inflows is effective on 
increasing interest rates by the means of the internal borrowing to pay back the 
investment and its interest. The series of these events occur within a cycle that 
warrants a continuum feed of capital inflows to cover interest payments and the on-
going appreciation of the real exchange rate (Stiglitz, 2000; Taylor, 1998; Calvo, 
1998; Diaz-Alejandro, 1985). 
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Figure.4.Real Interest Rates 
 
The exchange rate based disinflation and stabilisation program of 2000 lead 
to increase of the Central Bank’s foreign assets and that of monetary base by 
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increasing the capital flows so real interest rates collapsed in 2000. IMF financial 
package of $10.5 billion improved the reserves early in January 2001. However, 
liquidity squeeze continued due to IMF funding through the Supplementary 
Reserve Facility. As a result of insistence to preserved exchange rate policy, 
exchange rates were stabilised temporarily but the policy worsened interest rates 
which increased above their pre-crisis levels. The program ended with the 
announcement of free float exchange rate regime on 22 February 2001, and Turkey 
has started a new stabilisation program that was directed by the IMF in mid-May 
2001. 
 
 After the inception of capital account liberalization, the TL is observed to 
be mostly on an appreciation trend (see Figure 5). Özlale and Yeldan (2002), for 
instance, report that extend of appreciation of the TL reached to 18% over 1989 to-
May 2002.1 Combined effect of capital account liberalization with the 
abandonment of the real exchange rate rule led to a sharp real appreciation of 
1989-1990. Even there was a moderate level of appreciation untill 1994, started 
control of government on interest rates of the domestic bonds caused a 
depreciation which has become a stabilizer of the real exchange rate for the 
following five years. However, the observed appreciation of the real exchange rate 
in 2000 crisis has deteriorated the macro economic balances, especially in trade. 
Due to the flight of the capital inflows by the crisis, Turkey has entered a foreign 
exchange bottleneck and increased demand led to depreciation of the Turkish 
currency.  
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Figure.5.Real Exchange Rate, Turkey (1987=100) 
 
A country with a sufficiently large stock of foreign currency debt, like 
Turkey, is vulnerable to the crisis because with the movement of the exchange 
rates, the balance sheet deteriorates and firms cannot service their debts and 
lenders and borrowers want to take their money out (Chang and Velasco, 1998; 
Calvo, 1998; Fernandez- Arias and Lombardo, 1998; Eichengreen and Hausmann, 
1999; Krugman, 1999).  This is the one of the reasons for the emergence of the 
crisis in Turkey. Turkey’s exchange rate volatility followed a skyrocketing path 
during the crisis periods. Under the 1994 and 2001 crises, it shows an extreme 
acceleration. However, since Turkey avoided from the negative impacts of the East 
Asian Crisis in 1997, it did not face with exchange rate volatility. Furthermore, 
increased foreign exchange reserves with the escaped capital flows from the crisis 
countries were effective on the exchange rate balances during Russian Crisis in 
1998 that was also weaker than the 1994 and 2001 crises. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
1 Based on PPP comparison of the TL against the US$, and using the whole sale price index (1989 
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Figure.6.Exchange Rate Volatility, Turkey 
 
The imports and consumption increase due to appreciation of exchange 
rates by the effects of capital flows because appreciation of exchange rates makes 
the real value of domestic currency relatively higher by resulting increase of 
demand. An increase of demand to tradeable goods increases imports by causing 
the deterioration of trade balance. On the other hand, a demand increase to non-
tradeable goods comes into being a rise in domestic production and in the price of 
the non- tradeable goods. Turkey’s economic history is full of severe current 
account deficits after capital account liberalization. During the 1992, 1993 and the 
first quarter of 1994, Turkey faced with current account deficit in most of the 
months due to higher imports compared with the exports. In 1993, the unfunded 
expansionary policies of the government led to an explosion of the domestic 
demand and worsened export performance led to the deterioration of the trade 
deficit. However, there was a current account balance improvement due to the 
huge ,epreciation in 1994. On the other hand, the severe appreciation of TL. in 
                                                                                                                                                                    
= 100). 
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2000 and the impact of Customs Union with EU caused to deterioration of trade 
balance by causing to increase of imports. 
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Figure.7.Current Account Balance 
 
 In the pre-crisis periods, huge capital inflows of these periods were 
separated on current account deficit allocation rather than reserve accumulation as 
opposed to current account accumulation took place to keep the real exchange rate 
constant that was a post-crisis policy ( Celasun, et al., 1999).  Yet, the high 
sensitivity of the financial arbiters to the balance on the current account is clearly 
visible in that both surges of the current account deficits in 1993 (with 3.6%) and 
in 2000 (with 4.8%) were associated with the sudden reversals of the hot money 
flows and concomitant financial crises of 1994 and 2001. 
 
By the opening of capital account, the capital flows that have been associated 
with large public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) constituted another source 
of fragility. Throughout the 1970`s and 1980`s, Turkish government financed its 
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deficit with Central Bank advances (monetisation) mostly. After the removal of the 
interest ceilings and some other serial reforms, real interest rates started to show 
positive values. Financial institutions and rentiers adapted to new interest rates and 
due to the changing economic environment, the government passed to financing of 
deficit with the government debt instruments (GDI). After the capital account 
liberalization, the PSBR financing with the issue of GDI`s to the internal market 
has been the major method. Therefore, the inevitable result of this method came 
into being as rising domestic debt that was more than 50% of the stock of the 
existing debt, which was trapped in a Ponzi-situation2, during 1990`s. (Boratav, et 
al., 2002; Voyvoda and Yeldan, 2002).  
 
 High interest rates on GDI`s attracted capital flows. The resulting capital 
flows have been directed to public sector financing rather than entering to the 
financial system. However, the usage of capital flows in the deficit financing led to 
the increase of short-term borrowing for the public sector due to the fact that the 
composition of capital flows was short- term and mostly of the portfolio flows 
type. Getting into debt with shot-term maturity deepened the debt financing 
problems of Turkey because the government borrowed continuously to meet its 
increasing interest payments and payment of debts. Increases in budget deficit 
resulted with the increase of the public sectors’ borrowing requirement (PSBR) 
during the long period of budget deficit of the last decade.  
 
                                                           
2 Ponzi-situation defines the storage case of the cash flows from assets in the near-term as compared 
with the cash payment commitments. In the “Ponzi Finance”, the financial authorities must increase 
the outstanding debt to meet the previous financial obligation. 
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Figure.8.Ratio of PSBR to GNP 
Deterioration of the macroeconomic balances of a country with capital 
inflows would also affect the vulnerability to the crisis. There are three indicators 
to measure the vulnerability to the crisis: a large appreciation of the exchange rate, 
a weak banking system and low levels of the foreign exchange reserves (Sachs, et 
al., 1996). Turkey’s ratio of short-term debt to international reserves has been 
extremely high over the last decade. Availability of reserves with respect to short-
term external debt is an indicator of the fragility of an economy against crisis 
because extreme outflow of capital can be compensated with reserves. However, if 
the ratio is high which means that reserves are used to finance short-term external 
debt mostly then the country cannot defend itself against the capital flight. A 
country with the short-term liabilities to foreign lenders which are greater than its 
reserves is three times more likely to experience a reversal in capital flows (Rodrik 
and Velasco, 2000). The case of Turkey is one of the examples of this situation 
because it has a weak banking system, low reserves and capital inflows cause large 
appreciation of the real exchange rate by exhibiting all of the indicators of  
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vulnerability to crisis. Debt with short-term maturity was the main indicator of the 
reversal of capital flows in 1997 Asian Crisis (Lopez-Mejia, 1999). Central Bank’s 
short-term debt to international reserves ratio jumped up in December 2000.  
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Figure.9.Ratio of Short-term Debt to CB Reserves 
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5 Consequences of The Capital Inflows 
 
Turkey’s case was one of the first experiences for large reversal of capital 
flows in the 1990s. A common reason for the countries that lived reversal of capital 
flows has been the lack of confidence in domestic macroeconomic policies (Lopez-
Mejia, 1999). Exposition of Turkey to the portfolio flows rather than foreign direct 
investment widens current account balance, leads rapid monetary growth, creates 
inflationary pressures, causes real exchange rate appreciation so the reversal of the 
capital flows is riskier for financial sector.  
 
Although some positive association between growth and capital flows has 
been investigated by recent studies, this is not a general case for all country 
studies. The literature has identified sources of diversity such as democracy level 
of the country, implemented economic policies, economic restrictions, and so on. 
World Bank studies showed that capital inflows during 1990s had a boost effect on 
growth, but in the longer time frame of 1970-1998, studies produced a significant 
negative relationship (see, e.g., Oxfam America, 2002).  
 
Financial flows boost growth in developing countries by affecting 
consumption and investment. Capital inflows reduce the volatility of consumption 
because they provide an opportunity for risk diversification and they also allow 
international borrowing that prevents temporary declines in income. However, 
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excess expansion of the aggregate demand that is a result of capital inflows causes 
negative impacts on the financial sector (Lopez-Mejia, 1999). Furthermore, 
government guarantees on deposits encourage over lending and over borrowing in 
terms of both lenders and borrowers and demolishe the discipline of the market. 
Loss of balance in financial markets increases as capital inflows tend to rise, 
especially guarantees provokes moral hazard where financial transfers with short-
term maturity by strengthening fragility of the shallow financial markets. 
 
Capital inflows normally tend to increase the share of investment in GDP. 
However, there are two ways in which capital inflows fail to pass through 
investments: using resources that come with capital inflows in consumption rather 
than investment and failure to increase import in excess of exports whether these 
imports are used in consumption or investment (Oxfam America, 2002). If capital 
inflows are consumed rather than invested, there will be no gain to pay back 
foreign capital with interests. One reason for the occurrence of this case is the 
Central Bank’s sterilisation that is the action of buying foreign exchange from the 
domestic financial market. Sterilisation capital flows increase the domestic interest 
rates due to the liquidity squeeze and therefore it may reduce investment.  
 
In most of the countries, capital inflows were associated with current 
account deficits. The enlargement of the current account deficit has occurred 
because of both increase of investment and decrease of savings. Capital inflow 
increase the share of consumption and investment in GDP and decreases the share 
of saving in GDP so causes deterioration of current account balance.  
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According to standard open economy models, increase in consumption and 
investment causes appreciation of the real exchange rates. If the capital flows leak 
to the consumption rather than investment mostly, it makes real exchange rate 
appreciation more likely. A real exchange rate appreciation during the capital 
inflows shows a higher risk for domestic currency depreciation. Additionally, 
appreciation of real exchange rate destroys trade balance and competitiveness by 
increasing dependency on imports. 
 
Lack of credibility in an exchange rate-based inflation stabilisation program 
comes into being as a higher level in the current nominal interest rates than 
expected level. Additionally, macroeconomic outcomes show the same reactions 
with the case, which is observed during the temporary decline in the international 
interest rates (Calvo and Vegh, 1993). This is the case that Turkey experienced 
with 2000 exchange rate based inflation stabilisation program.   
 
Appreciation of real exchange rate also increases aggregate demand 
(Yenturk, 1996). If aggregate demand increases for non-tradeable goods, the only 
way to compensate the demand is an increase in the domestic production and the 
price of non-tradeable goods also increases due to increased demand. If aggregate 
demand increases for tradeable goods, it is satisfied with imports. Excess increase 
of aggregate demand indicates its effects as inflationary pressures, real exchange 
rate appreciation and widening current account deficit. However, the resulting 
effects on inflationary pressures and exchange rates will be largely determined 
with the exchange rate regime and the amount of the reserve accumulation. Under 
free float, positive shocks to the capital account creates no change on international 
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reserves and monetary aggregates but a real exchange rate appreciation that 
stimulates a current account deficit is the forthcoming result. Under fixed exchange 
rate regime, defending the parity requires the intervention of the monetary 
authorities and the intervention leads to rise of reserves and money supply, lowers 
the domestic interest rates and increases asset prices. Then the result is expansion 
of aggregate demand with a rise in domestic inflation. Actually, under the fully 
free movement of capital, setting the exchange rate fixed is not possible. The 
country under these circumstances should follow a floating exchange rate regime 
setting monetary policy free from controlling a fixed exchange rate or a narrow 
band (UNCTAD, 2001). 
 
Real interest rates play a significant role in directing capital flows. 
Especially, high short-term real interest rates prepare an attractive environment for 
short-term capital flows that are seeking arbitrage opportunities. Regardless of the 
initial level of interest rates and exchange rates, capital inflows to the developing 
countries apt to create an arbitrage margin by increasing domestic interest rates and 
appreciating real exchange rates latter. The series of these events occur within a 
cycle that needs to a continuum feed of capital inflows to cover interest payments 
and an appreciation of the real exchange rate (Yenturk, 1996). 
 
Speculative financial environment that is a result of the volatility of capital 
inflows raises external debt, which is held by public sector. The increase of the 
external debt, inturn, is the main factor behind the accumulation of the burden of 
interest payments and that of the rising public sector borrowing requirement 
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(PSBR). Since increase in PSBR is financed with the government debt instruments 
(GDIs), the domestic interest rate rises and attracts new capital inflows in Turkey. 
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6 Econometric Investigation 
 
In this section I study econometrically three related issues: first, I use a time 
series, multiple regression model to investigate the relationship between short-term 
financial capital (hot money) inflows and the key macroeconomic variables.  Next, 
I use the same methodology to infer about the relationship between private fixed 
investments and the hot money inflows, together with the key macro economic 
prices.  
 
 
6-1. Model And Data Specification Of The Relationship                         
Between Financial Capital Inflows And Macro Economic Variables 
 
In modelling short-term capital flows, I used the least square regression as 
the most common method of estimating the parameters of a multiple linear 
regression model. Time-series analysis of data for Turkey includes the country-
specific (pull) factors and the monthly data covers a period of 1992:01 to 2001:12 
(120 observations in all). All series are obtained from the Central Bank of Turkey 
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except the interest rates, which are obtained from Turkish SPO and the investment 
data that is obtained from The Undersecreteriat Turkish Treasury. 
The model specification is as follow 
 
ft= C+ΣαjXjt-k+εt 
 
where 
ft: inflow of the short-term capital to the country in period t 
Xjt-k: explanatory variable j at time t-k, k=1,........,n 
and where C and αj are all parameters to be estimated 
 
In this model, the variables in X are index of the Istanbul Stock Exchange 
National-100 (STOCK), the real exchange rate (RER), the real interest rate 
(REALINTWPI), the ratio of the public sector borrowing requirement to GNP 
(PSBRGNP), industrial production index (IP), a ratio to indicate openness 
(OPENNESS) and the ratio of short-term debt to central Bank’s foreign reserves 
(RATIO). The equational form of the econometric model of the capital inflows is 
given below: 
 
log(GROSSINFt)=β0+β1log(STOCKt-2)+β2log(REALINTWPIt-6)+β3log(RERt-
2)+β4DUM94*log(RERt-2)+β5dum2001*log(RERt-2) 
                               +β6dum98*log(RERt-2)+β7log(PSBRGNPt-7)+β8log(IPt-       
1)+β9log(GROSSINFt-1)+β10log(OPENNESSt-1) 
+β11log(RATIOt-6)+εt 
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6-1-A The Data  Analysis  With The Econometric Test Techniques 
 
First I have performed tests for normality, autocorrelation, order of 
integration and cointegration.  
 
Testing the normality of the series, the quantile-quantile method is used. 
After ploting the quantiles of the chosen series against a theoretical distribution, in 
most of the series, I have found that the QQ-plot is straight line, or approximately 
close to a straight line, which implies normality of the series 
 
Correlograms are used to check the autocorrelation procedure of the series. 
For no serial correlation, the autocorrelations and the partial autocorrelations at all 
lags (it is tested for the 12 lags for the data series of the model) should be nearly 
zero which shows the stationarity of the series. Checking for the correlograms for 
the data series, one can observe autocorrelation relation at least for the first lags of 
the series, which implies the non-stationarity of the observations. 
  
Although the properties of a sample correlogram are useful tools for 
detecting the possible presence of unit roots, the method is nearly imprecise. 
Therefore, Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Unit Root Test was performed for the 
series for 12 lags. For the hot money model, I found a set of I (1) variables. Since 
such kind of sets produce I (0) disturbance term, I could regress the model without 
considering any differentiation for the variables to eliminate problems related with  
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non-stationarity. Order of the integration and the test results are given  in Table.2 
(see.Table. 4 in APPENDIX B) 
 
Checking the validity of the claim that the residuals are zero order for the 
hot money model, I applied the Engle- Granger two-step method and found that the 
residuals are I(0) for the model. Investigation suggests that the combination of the 
non-stationary series may be stationary (Engle and Granger, 1987). The stationary 
linear combination is called the cointegration equation and may be interpreted as a 
lon-run equilibrium relation among the variables. 
 
 
6-1-B. Econometric Modelling And Implications 
 
The dependent variable of the model is the gross inflows of short-term 
capital (GROSSINF). It is the sum of portfolio investments by residents and non-
residents. In the model, I used the gross inflows of short-term capital, and not the 
net short-term capital flow (hot money) since the hot money is highly volatile in 
Turkey, so the implication power of the net flows is not as high as that of the gross 
inflows. Although the net short-term capital flows gave the expected signs for 
parameters, the R2 and adjusted R2 of the model were very low and Akaike 
information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) were very 
high. Additionally, in choosing the appropriate lag levels for the models, I searched 
for the lowest values of AIC and SIC. 
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Behaviour of stock prices is one of the most important regressors for short-
term capital flows. Thus, I used the lagged value of the index of the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange National-100 directly as a key regressor. Real interest rate is estimated 
from the three-month compounded nominal interest rates of T-bills by using rate of 
increase of WPI. Three dummies are used for the periods of the crisis that are 
affected Turkey mostly. In order: dum94 is used for the 1994 crisis, dum98 is used 
for the Russian crisis in 1998, and finally dum2001 is used for the crisis that was 
observed at the end of the 2000 and in the beginning of the 2001. To measure the 
effectiveness of fiscal policy and the effects of fiscal balances, I used the lagged 
value of the ratio of the public sector-borrowing requirement to GNP. Since the 
original data was yearly, I used seasonal adjustment for this ratio. Although I tried 
the model with budget balance, the results showed that the ratio of public sector 
borrowing to reserves of Central Bank of Turkey (CB) was a better explanatory 
variable than the budget balance. The lagged value of the industrial production 
index is used to measure whether capital flows are used to increase production and 
the index captures the total industry production. I used the lagged value of the 
dependent variable because the accelerated capital flows create an effect on itself. 
The ratio to measure the openness of the economy and its effect on capital inflows 
is estimated as the ratio of the sum of the absolute values of export and import to 
GDP. The lagged value of the ratio of the short-term external debt to Central 
Bank’s foreign reserves is used to examine the effect of the indebtedness of the 
country in case of the capital inflows. Although I structured a model with GDP that 
was quarterly in original data and seasonally adjusted for the model, the estimation  
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for GDP was found insignificant and the industrial production index was already 
capturing the explanations related with production more powerfully. 
 
The usage of log values of the variables improved R- squared, adjusted R- 
squared, Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz Information Criterion 
(SIC). Furthermore, it eliminated the multicollinearity problem with the RATIO 
and OPENNESS variables. In terms of the multicollinearity problem, the product 
of dummy variables and real exchange rates were also important to solve this 
problem. 
 
I also tried another model, which was regression with net errors and 
omissions (NEO) of the Balance of Payments. I designed the sum of capital 
inflows and NEO as the dependent variable and run the model but the findings 
were insignificant for the most of the variables. 
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6-1-C Econometric Results And Implications Of The Model 
 
Table. 1: 
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(GROSSINF)  
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic 
C -5.93 -0.52 
LOG(STOCK(-2)) 0.40 6.44*** 
LOG(REALINTWPI(-6)) 0.10 1.21 
LOG(RER(-2)) 3.76 4.41*** 
DUM94*LOG(RER(-2)) 0.07 1.77* 
DUM2001*LOG(RER(-2)) -0.05 -0.62 
DUM98*LOG(RER(-2)) 0.21 4.67*** 
LOG(PSBRGNP(-7)) 0.03 0.46 
LOG(IP(-1)) -2.06 -2.86*** 
LOG(GROSSINF(-1)) 0.21 2.38** 
LOG(OPENNESS(-1)) 1.34 3.25*** 
LOG(RATIO(-6)) 1.28 5.26*** 
R2=0,71  Durbin-Watson Statistic=1.81  F-Statistic=18.15 (P-value=0,00) 
 
Note: *** : significant at 1% and more, ** :significant at 5%, * :significant at 10% 
 
(1): Calculated as [[(1+i) / (1+p)]-1]*100 where i= compounded nominal interest rate 
of three month T-bills and p= rate of increase of WPI, both expressed as proportions. 
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As expected, the stock valuation and the real exchange rates are significant 
and their coefficients have positive sign. A raise in the value of the stock market 
index can be interpreted as the improvement in the economic and politic situation 
of Turkey so increases capital inflows. Additionally, increasing public sector 
borrowing requirement is financed with the issue of the government debt 
instruments, so this finance method increases the domestic interest rates. Capital 
inflows lead to exchange rate appreciation and compensation of the exchange rate 
appreciation requires capital inflows by creating a circle of linkages. 
 
 Although the estimation result for real interest rates is found insignificant, 
it has the expected positive sign. The intuition behind the insignificant finding for 
the real interest rates can be that the model includes just the pull (domestic) factors. 
Even though the international real interest rates may be considered as one of the 
exogenous variables, Turkey’s high real interest rate significantly deviates from the 
world real interest rate. Therefore, taking the difference between the domestic and 
he international interest rate does not change the high value and also the movement 
of the time series data of the domestic real interest rates. Actually, the high level of 
the domestic real interest rates is the most important reason of facing with the 
short-term capital inflows, which are arbitrage seeker, to Turkey. Furthermore, the 
very high value of inflation in Turkey causes emergence of too many negative 
valued real interest rates in the data to explain the effects of the real interest rates 
properly so I can say that inflationary pressures eliminates the power of real 
interest rates as a domestic factor.  
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 Dummy of the 2001 crisis is not significant.  Furthermore, except the 
dummy for the 2001 crisis, all of the dummies have positive sign. Negative sign of 
a dummy would suggest that the emergence of crisis constitutes a panic 
environment and investors of the short-term capital and even holders of liquid 
short-term liabilities convert their holdings to the foreign exchange and abandon 
the country immediately. Positive sign of the dummy could explain the emergence 
of the macro economic factors, which attract the capital inflows such as high 
interest rates in the crisis period. Especially Turkey’s crisis history exhibits the 
increased level of interest rates due to the liquidity bottleneck. However, the 
observed results for direction of the capital flows are highly associated with the 
political and the other economic factors during the high level of interest rates. 
 
Although the ratio of the public sector-borrowing requirement to GNP is 
insignificant, it has an expected positive sign.  
 
The industrial production index is highly significant and model suggests a 
negative sign for this independent variable. Although capital inflows should be 
associated with the increase of the productivity of the industrial sector, the negative 
sign of this coefficient may show a tendency of industrial sector in Turkey to be a 
rentier rather than using the resources that is a result of capital inflows in 
production. Studies on semi-industrialized countries such as Korea, Mexico and 
Turkey investigated a relation between the financial liberalization and increase in 
the rentier activities (see Epstein and Power, 2003). However, a decrease in the 
rentier incomes is expected in the case of emergence of financial crisis. The graph 
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below shows the movement of the share of rentier income in GDP for the period 
between 1983 and 1999: 
 
Figure.10.Rentier Income For Turkey, 1983-19993 
 
As observed from the graph, after the capital account liberalization in 1989, 
there is a remarkable increase in the rentier income as a share of GDP and during 
the crisis periods in 1994 and in 1998 there are decreases.  
 
The lagged value of the dependent variable is also significant and have a 
positive sign because the capital inflows are known to have characteristics of “herd 
behaviour” and any reason affecting capital inflows causes positively (negatively) 
further positive (negative) effects on the forthcoming capital inflows. 
 
The lagged value of the ratio that shows openness of the Turkish economy 
to trade is significant and indicates a positive relation because it is also a measure 
of globalization of a country. High level of imports is an indicator of the ease of 
                                                           
3 Source: Epstein and Power (2003) 
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entrance to the country by the outside investors. Especially, in terms of financial 
markets, the lack of capital controls is the indicator of the ease of capital 
movements in Turkey. Additionally, the high level of the exports shows Turkey’s 
ability in the international markets. Since increasing trend of globalization 
integrated all of the economies, it is one of the most important factors for capital 
flows throughout the world. 
  
As a fragility indicator, the ratio of short-term debt to reserves of the CB is 
expected to have a negative coefficient because the high value of a fragility 
indicator means a reduction in the capital inflows. However, our model end up 
with a positive coefficient that made me to check whether another fragility 
indicator was efficient. Therefore, I restructured the model with a new fragility 
indicator that was the ratio of M2y (an I (1) variable) to reserves of the CB (for 
results, see Table.6 in Appendix D). Although the new model exhibited improved 
value for the real interest rate, the new fragility indicator again could not explain 
the expected relation due to positive sign of its coefficient. Furthermore, the model 
failed to exhibit the expected positive sign of the ratio of public sector borrowing 
requirement to GNP by making it negative but the finding also did not indicate a 
high significance. 
 
Due to these results, I can consider that capital inflows are not sensitive to 
fragility indicators because investors put together the effects of fragility indicator 
and the political movements that are captured by the ISE (Istanbul Stock 
Exchange) market index as a proxy for the political index so they may observe the 
movements of the politic trends rather than fragility indicators. The reasoning of 
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this tendency may be the very high levels of the fragility indicators in the past and 
investors may follow political trends as the measure of the state of the economy. 
 
 
6-1-D. The Model Analysis  With The Econometric Test Techniques 
 
The model test procedure includes the tests for heteroscedasticity,  
autocorrelation and constancy of the model.  
 
Choosing the best model and considering alternative models, one should 
use the method of general-to-specific. In this method starting from a general 
congruent model, standard testing procedures eliminate statistically insignificant 
variables, with diagnostic tests checking the validity of reductions, reaching the 
final congruent selection (Krolzig and Hendry, 2001). 
 
In the step of checking validity of the model, I applied White 
Heteroskedasticity Test, the correlogram method checking autocorrelation and 
Chow Test for the constancy of the model are performed. With the aim of 
examining whether the variance of error is affected by any of the regressors, their 
squares or their cross products, I performed White Heteroskedasticity Test for the 
OLS regression. The test for heteroskedasticity is resulted with homoskedasticity 
of the equation for the hot money model with 0.05 significance level. Furthermore, 
the autocorrelation test shows no autocorrelation due to the values of 
autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation which are nearly zero so the model is 
stationary. Testing whether there is a structural change in the relationship i.e. 
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constancy of the model, Chow’s Breakpoint Test has been performed dividing the 
total period into two ( Chow, 1960). The break point is selected to be the 8th month 
of 1998 when a serious earthquake lived and produced significant detrimental 
effects on the macroeconomic balances. The year is also important in terms of 
emerged Russian Crisis. Since the F-statistic exhibits the constancy of the model 
with 0.51 probability ( about 5% significance level), the hypothesis that the 
coefficient vectors are the same in the two periods will not be rejected so the model 
is constant. 
 
With high values of R2 and the adjusted R2 and the low values of standard 
error of the regression and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz 
Information Criterion (SIC), the model seems reliable and highly explanatory for 
the capital inflows. Furthermore, the close value of the Durbin-Watson statistic to 
2 is also another indicator for the non-existence of the autocorrelation in the model. 
 
 
6.2.  The Relationship Among Private Investment, Financial Capital Flows 
And Macroeconomic Prices 
 
Capital inflows are expected to increase investment throughout two ways 
by the increasing demand to non-tradeable goods and increasing demand to 
tradeable goods. Increasing demand to non-tradeable goods provokes the domestic 
production in this area and also raises the price of the non-tradeable goods. On the 
other hand, demand for the import of the intermediate goods may increase.  
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On the other hand, increase in the capital inflow release the credit 
constraints and provide funds for the investment. Importance of the borrowing 
constraints is studied by Chhibber and van Wijnbergen (1992), Conway (1990), 
Rittenberg (1991) and Uygur (1993). However, except the study by Rittenberg, the 
other studies fail to consider the effects of the policy changes. Even tough the 
capital inflows are important in terms of the availability of the funds for 
investment; they may also cause fluctuations depending on whether they are 
foreign direct investment or short-term capital inflows in the form of portfolio 
investments and/or borrowing. Therefore, setting controls on the short-term capital 
inflows is necessary to avoid economic instability in the home country and even to 
prevent the possibility of financial crisis (Feldstein, 2002). 
 
Capital flows do not lead to increased investments if they are used in 
consumption or they increase the demand for the tradeable goods that are directly 
consumable by raising imports for that type of goods. Furthermore, since capital 
inflows to developing countries are mostly short term, innature, and they are highly 
sensitive to the economic fundamentals, they just create a boom-bust cycle creating 
an easy access of credit for the investment and excessively optimistic expectations.  
 
Accumulation of physical capital is regarded in the empirical literature as 
one of the important determinant of the economic growth (Levine and Renelt, 
1992). Since accumulation of capital provides resources for investment even at a 
lower cost, it also stimulates the increase of aggregate demand. Nevertheless, 
observations for the developing countries show that the private investment is more 
effective on growth than the public investment (Khan and Reinhart, 1990). On the 
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other hand, the stimulating effect of the real GDP growth on investment for 
developing countries is an observed empirical result (Ghura and Goodwin, 2000). 
 
Using the same econometric methodology with the previous model for 
quarterly data of the period 1992:1 to 2001:4, I constructed the following model 
for investment 
 
ht = B + ΣγiZit-k+ηt 
 
where 
ht: investment of the private sector in time t 
Zit-k: independent variable i at time t-k, k=1...n 
 
and where B and γi are all parameters to be estimated.   
 
In this model, the variables in Z are the current and lagged values of the 
gross domestic product level of Turkey (GDP), the lagged value of the gross 
inflows of the portfolio investments by the residents and non-residents 
(GROSSINF)-i.e. short-term capital inflows-, the lagged value of real interest rates 
(REINTWPI) given by the compounded nominal interest rate of three-month T 
bills, deflated by WPI inflation, the lagged value of the real wages (WAGES). 
Since the original data of short-term capital inflows and real interest rates are 
monthly, I take the average of the months for each quarter. The equation for the 
econometric modelling of the private investment is given below: 
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log(INVPRIt)=β0+β1log(GDPt-4)+β2log(REINTWPIt-1)+β3log(WAGESt-5) 
                       +β4log(GROSSINFt-3) +εt 
 
Analysing the data of the model, I applied quantile-quantile method to check 
the normality of the series, used correlograms to check autocorrelation, ADF unit 
root test to check the stationarity of the series and Engle-Granger two step method 
to check the cointegration.  
 
Since the quantile-quantile graphs exhibit approximately straight lines, I 
can say that the quarterly data for the investment model consist of normal series. 
Furthermore, autocorrelation analysis with the correlograms for 4 lags show no 
autocorrelation, i.e. the autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations at all lags are 
nearly zero. In the end of unit root test, I found an I (1) series of explanatory 
variables (see Table. 5 in Appendix C). Since I had the set of I (1) variables that 
are cointegrated, I regressed private investment on the other variables and the 
result would produce residuals that are I (0). Since the results of Engle-Granger 
two-step test produce I(0) residuals, I have a long-term relationship among the 
variables. 
 
Checking the validity of the private investment model, I performed White 
Heteroskedasticity  Test, correlogram method and Chow Test. The result of the 
White Test was homoskedasticity of the model with the 0.01 significance level. 
Correlograms show nearly zero autocorrelation and partial correlation for the all 
lags. Choosing the 3rd quartile of 1998 for the break point of the model, I 
investigated the constancy of the model with 0.049 probability. 
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6.2.A. Econometric Results And The Implications Of The Model 
 
Table. 2: 
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(INVPRI)  
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic 
C 15.99 2.15** 
LOG(GDP(-4)) 2,00 3.49*** 
LOG(REINTWPI(1)(-1)) -0.32 -1,42 
LOG(WAGES(-5)) -6,18 -6.79*** 
LOG(GROSSINF(-3)) 0,93 5.16*** 
R2=0,82  Durbin-Watson Statistic=1.16  F-Statistic=28.03 (P-value=0,00) 
 
Note: *** ;significant at 1% and more, ** :significant at 5%, * :significant at 10% 
 
(1): Calculated as [[(1+i)/(1+p)]-1]*100 where i= compounded nominal interest rate of 
three month T-bills and p= rate of increase of WPI, both expressed as proportions.   
 
 
I found all of the independent variables significant except the real interest 
rates. In the previous model I found a positive relation between the capital inflows 
and the real exchange rate which suggests that capital inflow cause the 
appreciation of real exchange rates. Due to appreciation of the real exchange rates, 
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the price of imports for the intermediate goods decreases so this raise in the 
imports seem to cause to an increase of the private investment. 
 
The coefficient of GDP exhibits a positive sign because the increase in the 
level of GDP increases the capital sources for investment so it provokes 
investment. On the other hand, I observed a negative sign for the real interest rates. 
Yet, this relation fails to be significant. 
 
Our findings show that there is a negative relation between wages and 
investment and it has a very high coefficient for our model so it implies a high 
impact on investment. Appreciation of the real exchange rate reduces the 
competitiveness of Turkey so the reduction of cost by the decrease of wages is the 
only remedy of the investors to keep their position in the international markets. 
 
Since capital inflows in Turkey come through the banking sector and they 
are mostly in the form of portfolio investments, efficient distribution of the funds 
for investment requires an efficient banking system. However, besides its 
weaknesses, Turkish banking system mostly focus on investing in government 
securities rather than providing credit to the private sector investments because of 
the safe and high returns of these securities. Therefore, the empirical estimation for 
the investment model gives a positive but small coefficient, which shows the weak 
positive effect of the capital inflows on the private investment and proves the 
inefficiency of the credit distribution system for Turkey. Furthermore, I observed 
that funds for investment leak mostly to the non-tradeable goods rather than 
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tradeable intermediate goods making the impact of the capital inflows to be weak 
on the private investment.  
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7 Concluding Comments 
 
The neo-liberal contemplation over financial liberalization is that an open and 
unregulated capital account is growth-inducive, leading to increased availability of 
loanable funds and enabling transfer of foreign technology.  Accordingly, freed 
from the strangulation of “financial repression”, financial intermediaries would be 
able to work more efficiently, bringing savers and investors together at lower cost. 
 
These expectations, however, have been challenged by the crisis episodes of 
the last two decades.  Both the numerous empirical case studies and the policy 
lessons of the Mexican, Turkish, Argentinean, and more recently East Asian 
experiences revealed that the expected beneficial effects of capital inflows have 
been overshadowed by the adverse impacts of excessive stock market volatility and 
the persistence of exchange rate risk against unforeseen fluctuations in the 
exchange rates.  In fact, large capital inflows as witnessed in recent years have 
posed serious dilemmas and created significant policy challenges.  The recent 
history of the financial crises in the “successful emerging markets” have clearly 
disclosed the undesirable macroeconomic effects of the large, uncontrolled capital 
inflows, such as persistence of high real interest rates, inflationary pressures, 
limitation of the power of the central banks to contain the pressures of monetary 
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expansion and of the threat of currency substitution, real exchange rate 
appreciation, and widening current account deficits. 
 
In this thesis, I attempted to address to these concerns within the realm of the 
Turkish experience following its capital account liberalization in 1989.  I identified 
capital inflows exclusively with the portfolio investments of residents and non-
residents abroad, and using time-series econometrics, I searched for the macro 
economic variables that best explain the behavior of capital inflows over 1992 to 
2002.  I further investigated the changing nature of the private investment function 
under post-capital account liberalization and studied its correlation with capital 
flows and the key macro economic prices, such as the exchange rate, the real rate 
of interest, and real wages. 
 
My results suggest that the financial capital inflows have a significant 
negative correlation with the industrial production index, and are positively 
correlated with real currency appreciation and trade openness.  I also found that the 
capital inflows have a positive relationship with the stock exchange index and with 
the one-month lagged value of inflows themselves.  The rate of interest and the 
PSBR failed to display statistically significant results, even though their 
coefficients were of the expected sign. 
 
Fixed private investment was found to have a positive relationship with 
financial capital inflows, but this was observed to be mostly due to an 
accumulation pattern towards non-traded sectors via currency appreciation.   The 
dependence of investments over exchange rate appreciation via speculative 
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financial flows highlights the speculative-led growth path of the Turkish economy 
over the 1990s.   
 
Finally, real wage costs were observed to carry a significant negative 
relationship with private investment. My interpretation of this result was that at a 
time of currency appreciation, investors had to rely on declining wage costs in 
order to keep their export competitiveness.  Under the volatile and uncertain 
conditions of speculation-driven investment patterns, the downward flexibility of 
real wages has to be seen as a concomitant factor of the post-financial 
liberalization episodes.  This finding also led us to hypothesize that in order to 
combat the detrimental consequences of the volatile patterns of aggregate demand, 
financial globalization would directly warrant suppression of the remunerations of 
wage-labor, since under conditions of currency appreciation and increasingly high 
real rates of interest, the whole burden of adjustment would necessarily fall on the 
downward flexibility of labor costs.  The detailed pursuit of this theme across other 
emerging market economies has to be seen as an agenda of future research. 
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APPENDICES:  
 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
Table. 3: 
 
  Characteristics of  Capital Flows in Turkey   
                
                
 1985 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
    1- FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (NET) 99 354 663 700 783 779 622 559 772 612 554 573 138 112 2769 
                
    2- PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT (NET) 0 1178 1386 547 623 2411 3917 1158 237 570 1634 -6711 3429 1022 -4515 
       a- ASSETS 0 -6 -59 -134 -91 -754 -563 35 -466 -1380 -710 -1622 -759 -593 -788 
            SECURITIES 0 -6 -59 -134 -91 -754 -563 35 -466 -1380 -710 -1622 -759 -593 -788 
               INFLOW (Security sales of residents abroad) 0 0 0 0 0 1859 4686 6147 2815 5304 3828 3356 4605 20188 11423 
               OUTFLOW (Security purchases of residents abroad) 0 0 0 0 0 -2613 -5249 -6112 -3281 -6684 -4538 -4978 -5364 -20781 -12211 
         b-LIABILITIES 0 1184 1445 681 714 3165 4480 1123 703 1950 2344 -5089 4188 1615 -3727 
              SECURITIES 0 0 17 89 147 359 753 1024 317 619 570 -4510 968 -4637 -3823 
          INFLOW(Securities purchases of nonresidents in Turkey) 0 0 0 0 0 463 1287 1942 1298 1653 2499 10137 3738 2971 3300 
          OUTFLOW(Securities sales of nonresidents in Turkey) 0 0 0 0 0 -104 -534 -918 -981 -1034 -1929 -14647 -2770 -7608 -7123 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table. 3 (cont’d): 
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     3- SHORT-TERM CAPITAL MOVEMENTS 1479 -2281 -584 3000 -3020 1396 2994 -5190 3635 2665 -7 1313 1024 4200 -11321 
                
               BANKS 296 -43 -29 1014 663 2404 3782 -6601 801 769 724 63 2070 4741 -7052 
                   Loans Received 0 0 0 0 43186 64767 122053 75439 76427 8824 19110 19288 122673 209432 110270 
                   Repayments 0 0 0 0 -42523 -62363 -118271 -82040 -75626 -8055 -18386 -19225 -120603 -204691 -117322 
4. NET ERRORS AND OMISSIONS -837 515 971 -468 948 -1190 -2162 1832 2432 1499 -987 -697 1631 -2788 -2122 
                
MEMO ITEMS (As a Percentage of the GNP)                               
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE -1.9 1.8 0.9 -1.7 0.2 -0.6 -3.6 2.0 -1.4 -1.3 -1.4 1.0 -0.7 -4.8 1.4 
PSBR 3.6 4.8 5.3 7.4 10.2 10.6 12.0 7.9 5.0 8.6 7.7 9.4 15.6 12.5 16.4 
OUTSTANDING DOMESTIC DEBT 3.5 5.7 6.3 7.0 8.1 11.7 12.8 14.0 14.6 18.8 21.4 22.5 29.3 28.7 68.1(1) 
TOTAL ASSETS ISSUED 5.5 7.8 8.7 6.5 8.5 17.6 20.6 24.8 21.9 36.3 23.9 30.4 39.8 42.1 74.3 
                  Public Sector 5.1 6.9 7.7 5.5 7.4 15.9 16.8 22.7 19.8 35.3 22.9 29.4 38.7 37.5 68.5 
                  Private Sector 0.4 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.7 3.8 2.1 2.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 4.6 5.8 
BANKING SECTOR CREDITS 10.9 17.6 16.1 16.5 12.4 12.7 14.0 13.3 16.5 18.5 21.7 19.4 20.1 20.4 20.1 
Real rate of growth of GNP (%) 4.3 1.5 1.6 9.4 0.3 6.4 8.1 -6.1 8.0 7.1 8.3 3.9 -6.1 6.3 -9.4 
Sources: State Planning Organization, The Central Bank of the Turkish Republic                         
(1) Estimated                
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APPENDIX B 
 
Table. 4: 
Variable ADF Test Order of Integration 
LOG(GROSSINF) -3.31 1 
LOG(STOCK) -4.00 1 
LOG(REALINTWPI) -2.62 1 
LOG(RER) -4.92 1 
DUM94*LOG(RER) -3.45 1 
DUM2001*LOG(RER) -3.88 1 
DUM98*LOG(RER) -3.75 1 
LOG(PSBRGNP) -8.33 1 
LOG(IP) -2.63 1 
LOG(GROSSINF) -3.20 1 
LOG(OPENNESS) -2.12 1 
LOG(RATIO) -3.39 1 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Table. 5: 
Variable ADF Test Order of Integration 
LOG(INVPRI) -5.22 1 
LOG(GDP(-4)) -20.60 1 
LOG(REINTWPI(1)(-3)) -3.55 1 
LOG(WAGES(-3)) -3.07 1 
LOG(GROSSINF(-1)) -4.36 1 
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Table. 6: 
Dependent Variable: LOG(GROSSINF)  
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic 
C 3.65 1.00 
LOG(STOCK(-2)) 0.32 5.77*** 
LOG(REALINTWPI(-6)) 0.20 2.43** 
LOG(RER(-2)) 1.88 2.81*** 
DUM94*LOG(RER(-2)) 0.05 1.44 
DUM2001*LOG(RER(-2)) 0.03 -0.36 
DUM98*LOG(RER(-2)) 0.22 4.53*** 
LOG(PSBRGNP(-3)) -0.13 -1.68* 
LOG(IP(-1)) -1.90 -2.59*** 
LOG(GROSSINF(-1)) 0.24 2.67*** 
LOG(OPENNESS(-1)) 1.22 2.80*** 
LOG(M2yRE(-6)) 0.97 4.34*** 
R2=0.69  Durbin-Watson Statistic=1.80  F-Statistic=17,01 (P-value=0,00) 
 
Note: *** ;significant at 1% and more, ** :significant at 5%, * :significant at 10% 
 
 
(1): Calculated as [[(1+i) / (1+p)]-1]*100 where i= nominal compounded interest rate 
of three month T-bills and p= rate of increase of WPI, both expressed as proportions. 
 
 
